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We consider a stochastic differential equation that is controlled
by means of an additive finite-variation process. A singular stochastic
controller, who is a minimizer, determines this finite-variation pro-
cess, while a discretionary stopper, who is a maximizer, chooses a
stopping time at which the game terminates. We consider two closely
related games that are differentiated by whether the controller or the
stopper has a first-move advantage. The games’ performance indices
involve a running payoff as well as a terminal payoff and penalize
control effort expenditure. We derive a set of variational inequalities
that can fully characterize the games’ value functions as well as yield
Markovian optimal strategies. In particular, we derive the explicit so-
lutions to two special cases and we show that, in general, the games’
value functions fail to be C1. The nonuniqueness of the optimal strat-
egy is an interesting feature of the game in which the controller has
the first-move advantage.
1. Introduction. We consider a one-dimensional ca`gla`d process X that
satisfies the stochastic differential equation
dXt = b(Xt)dt+ dξt + σ(Xt)dWt, X0 = x ∈R,(1)
where ξ is a ca`gla`d finite variation adapted process such that ξ0 = 0, and
W is a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion. The games that we
analyze involve a controller, who is a minimizer and chooses a process ξ,
and a stopper, who is a maximizer and chooses a stopping time τ . The two
agents share the same performance criterion, which is given either by
Jvx(ξ, τ) = E
[∫ τ
0
e−Λth(Xt)dt+
∫
[0,τ [
e−Λt dξˇt + e−Λτ g(Xτ )1{τ<∞}
]
(2)
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or by
Jwx (ξ, τ) = E
[∫ τ
0
e−Λth(Xt)dt+
∫
[0,τ ]
e−Λt dξˇt + e−Λτ g(Xτ+)1{τ<∞}
]
,(3)
where ξˇ is the total variation process of ξ and
Λt =
∫ t
0
δ¯(Xs)ds(4)
for some positive functions h, g, δ¯ :R→ R+. The performance index Jv re-
flects a situation where the stopper has the “first-move advantage” rela-
tive to the controller. Indeed, if the controller makes a choice such that
∆ξ0 6= 0 and the stopper chooses τ = 0, then Jvx(ξ, τ) = g(x). On the other
hand, the performance index Jw reflects a situation where the controller
has the “first-move advantage” relative to the stopper: if the controller
makes a choice such that ∆ξ0 6= 0, and the stopper chooses τ = 0, then
Jwx (ξ, τ) = |∆ξ0|+ g(x+∆ξ0).
Given an initial condition x ∈R, (ξ∗, τ∗) is an optimal strategy if
Jfx (ξ
∗, τ)≤ Jfx (ξ∗, τ∗)≤ Jfx (ξ, τ∗)(5)
for all admissible strategies (ξ, τ), where “f” stands for either “v” or “w.” If
optimal strategies (ξ∗v , τ∗v ), (ξ∗w, τ∗w) exist for the two games for every initial
condition x ∈R, then we define the games’ value functions by
v(x) = Jvx(ξ
∗
v , τ
∗
v ) and w(x) = J
w
x (ξ
∗
w, τ
∗
w),(6)
respectively.
Zero-sum games involving a controller and a stopper were originally stud-
ied by Maitra and Sudderth [16] in a discrete time setting. Later, Karatzas
and Sudderth [12] derived the explicit solution to a game in which the state
process is a one-dimensional diffusion with absorption at the endpoints of
a bounded interval, while, Weerasinghe [23] derived the explicit solution
to a similar game in which the controlled volatility is allowed to vanish.
Karatzas and Zamfirescu [14] developed a martingale approach to general
controller and stopper games, while, Bayraktar and Huang [2] showed that
the value function of such games is the unique viscosity solution to an appro-
priate Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation if the state process is a controlled
multi-dimensional diffusion. Further games involving control as well as dis-
cretionary stopping have been studied by Hamade`ne and Lepeltier [9] and
Hamade`ne [8]. To a large extent, controller and stopper games have been
motivated by several applications in mathematical finance and insurance,
including the pricing and hedging of American contingent claims (e.g., see
Karatzas and Wang [13]) and the minimization of the lifetime ruin proba-
bility; for example, see Bayraktar and Young [3].
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Games such as the ones we study here arise in the context of several
applications. To fix ideas, consider the singular stochastic control problem
that aims at minimizing the performance criterion
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−Λth(Xt)dt+
∫
[0,∞[
e−Λt dξˇt
]
over all controlled processes ξ subject to the dynamics given by (1). The so-
lution to the special case of this problem that arises when b≡ 0, σ ≡ 1, δ¯ > 0
is a constant and h(x) = κx2, for some κ > 0, was derived by Karatzas [11]
and is characterized by a constant β: it is optimal to exercise minimal control
so as to keep the state process X inside the range [−β,β] at all times. The
qualitative nature of such a solution has lead to the study of several appli-
cations in which one wants to keep a state process within an optimal range
by means of singular stochastic control. Such applications include: space-
ship control (see Bather and Chernoff [1] who introduced singular stochastic
control) where, for example, X represents the deviation of a satellite from a
given altitude and ξ represents fuel expenditure; the control of an exchange
rate (see Miller and Zhang [17]) or an inflation rate (see Chiarolla and Hauss-
mann [4]) where, for example, X models a rate or the fluctuations of a rate
around a target, and ξ models the central bank’s cumulative intervention
efforts; the so-called goodwill problem (see Jack, Jonhnson and Zervos [10])
where, for example, X is used to model the image that a product has in a
market, and ξ represents the cumulative costs associated with raising the
product’s image, for example, through advertising.1
Any of the applications discussed in the previous paragraph can give rise
to a zero-sum game between a controller and a stopper that are different
incarnations of the same decision maker. Such games in which the players
model competing objectives of the same decision maker have attracted con-
siderable interest in the context of several applications. For instance, they
have been studied in the context of robust optimization where “the agent
maximizes utility by his choice of control, while an evil agent minimizes
utility by his choice of perturbation” (Williams [24]), or in the context of
time-consistent optimization where a decision maker’s problem is analyzed
as a “game between successive selves, each of whom can commit for an
infinitesimally small amount of time” (Ekeland, Mbodji and Pirvu [6]). In
what follows, we focus on one of the applications of the games that we study
(several others arising in the context of the ones discussed in the previous
paragraph can be developed following similar arguments).
Consider a central bank that intervenes to keep fluctuations of an ex-
change rate within an optimal range. At any time, the central bank could
1We have included here only one indicative reference for each of the areas mentioned
because there is a rich literature for each of them.
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be confronted with the costs of their policy, in particular, with the demand
that its board should be replaced. In this context, the controller can rep-
resent the central bank’s targeting efforts, while the stopper can represent
a political veto on their policy. In abstract terms, such a problem can be
viewed as one of optimization by a single agent. However, its analysis and
solution requires its formulation as a zero-sum game. Indeed, the conflicting
natures of such a decision maker’s objectives do not really allow for them
to be addressed by solving a (one-player) stochastic optimization problem.
For instance, the solution to the one-player problem derived by Davis and
Zervos [5], which is akin to the special case we solve in Section 5, involves
markedly different optimal strategies that would be absurd in the context
of an applications such as the one we discuss here.
In particular, the controller tries to minimize, for example, the perfor-
mance index Jw given by (3). From the controller’s perspective, Jw penal-
izes large fluctuations of the targeted rate for choices such as h(x) = κx2,
for some κ > 0, as well as the expenditure of intervention effort. On the
other hand, the stopper tries to maximize the same performance criterion
Jw because large values of Jw indicate that intervention is “expensive,”
namely, unsustainable. From the stopper’s perspective, the choice of the re-
ward function g can be used to further quantify the bank’s reluctance to
intervene, for example, in situations where the rate assumes values way off
the target. Furthermore, the choice of Jw rather than Jv can be associated
with a central bank that is more, rather than less, keen to intervene.
The development of a theory for zero-sum games such as the ones we
study can therefore provide a useful analytic tool to decision makers such
as a central bank in their considerations on whether and how to optimally
target a state process such as an exchange rate. Such analytic tools can
be most valuable because getting a policy wrong can have rather extreme
economic and political consequences. For instance, one can recall the UK’s
crash out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992.
The games that we study here are the very first ones involving singular
stochastic control and discretionary stopping. Combining the intuition un-
derlying the solution of standard singular stochastic control problems and
standard optimal stopping problems by means of variational inequalities
(e.g., see Karatzas [11] and Peskir and Shiryaev [18], resp.), we derive a
system of inequalities that can fully characterize the value function w. We
further show that these inequalities can also characterize the value function
v as well as an optimal strategy. Surprisingly, we have not seen a way to
combine all of them into a single equation. Our main results include the
proof of a verification theorem that establishes sufficient conditions for a
solution to these inequalities to identify with the value function w and yield
the value function v as well as an optimal strategy, which we fully charac-
terize. In this context, we also show that the two games we consider share
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the same optimal strategy, and we prove that
v(x) = max{w(x), g(x)} for all x ∈R.
The nonuniqueness of the optimal strategy when the controller has the first-
move advantage is an interesting result that arises from our analysis; see
Remark 1 at the end of Section 4.
We then derive the explicit solutions to two special cases. The first one is
the special case that arises if X is a standard Brownian motion, and h, g are
quadratics. In this case, the value function w is C1, but the C1 regularity
of the value function v may fail at a couple of points. The second special
case is a simpler example revealing that both of the value functions w and
v may fail to be C1 at certain points and showing that the optimal strategy
may take qualitatively different form, depending on parameter values.
The paper is organized as follows. Notation and assumptions are described
in Section 2, while, a heuristic derivation of the system of inequalities char-
acterizing the solution to the two games is developed in Section 3 (see Defi-
nition 1). In Section 4, the main results of the paper, namely, a verification
theorem (Theorem 1) and the construction of the optimal controlled pro-
cess associated with a function satisfying the requirements of Definition 1
(Lemma 1) are proved. In Sections 5 and 6, the explicit solutions to two
nontrivial special cases are derived.
2. Notation and assumptions. We fix a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,
Ft,P) satisfying the usual conditions and carrying a standard one-dimensional
(Ft)-Brownian motionW . We denote by As the set of all (Ft)-stopping times
and by Ac the family of all (Ft)-adapted finite-variation ca`gla`d processes ξ
such that ξ0 = 0. Every process ξ ∈Ac admits the decomposition ξ = ξc+ ξj
where ξc, ξj are (Ft)-adapted finite-variation ca`gla`d processes such that ξc
has continuous sample paths,
ξc0 = ξ
j
0 = 0 and ξ
j
t =
∑
0≤s<t
∆ξs for all t > 0,
where ∆ξs = ξs+ − ξs for s ≥ 0. Given such a decomposition, there exist
(Ft)-adapted continuous processes (ξc)+, (ξc)− such that
(ξc)+0 = (ξ
c)−0 = 0, ξ
c = (ξc)+ − (ξc)− and ξˇc = (ξc)+ + (ξc)−,
where ξˇc is the total variation process of ξc.
The following assumption that we make implies that, given any ξ ∈ Ac,
(1) has a unique strong solution; see Protter [19], Theorem V.7.
Assumption 1. The functions b, σ :R→R satisfy
|b(x)− b(y)|+ |σ(x)− σ(y)| ≤K|x− y| for all x, y ∈R,
for some constant K > 0, and σ2(x) > σ0 for all x ∈ R, for some constant
σ0 > 0.
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We also make the following assumption on the data of the reward func-
tionals defined by (2)–(4).
Assumption 2. The functions δ¯, h, g :R→R+ are continuous, and there
exists a constant δ > 0 such that δ¯(x)> δ for all x ∈R.
It is worth noting at this point that, given ξ ∈Ac, we may have E[ξˇt] =∞,
for some t > 0. In such a case, the reward functionals given by (2)–(3) are
well defined but may take the value ∞.
3. Heuristic derivation of variational inequalities for the value functionw.
Before addressing the game, we consider the optimization problems faced by
the two players in the absence of competition. To this end, we consider any
bounded interval ]γ1, γ2[, we denote by Tγ1 (resp., Tγ2) the first hitting time
of {γ1} (resp., {γ2}), and we fix any constants Cγ1 ,Cγ2 ≥ 0.
Given an initial condition x ∈ ]γ1, γ2[, a controller is concerned with solv-
ing the singular stochastic control problem whose value function is given
by
vssc(x;γ1, γ2,Cγ1 ,Cγ2)
= inf
ξ∈Ac
E
[∫ Tγ1∧Tγ2
0
e−Λth(Xt)dt+
∫
[0,Tγ1∧Tγ2 [
e−Λt dξˇt(7)
+ e−ΛTγ1Cγ11{Tγ1<Tγ2} + e
−ΛTγ2Cγ21{Tγ2<Tγ1}
]
.
In the presence of Assumptions 1 and 2, vssc is C
1 with absolutely continuous
first derivative and identifies with the solution to the variational inequality
min{Lu(x) + h(x),1− |u′(x)|}= 0
with boundary conditions
u(γ1) =Cγ1 and u(γ2) =Cγ2 ,
where the operator L is defined by
Lu(x) = 12σ2(x)u′′(x) + b(x)u′(x)− δ¯(x)u(x);(8)
see Sun [22], Theorem 3.2. In this case, it is optimal to exercise minimal
action so that the state process X is kept outside the interior of the set
Cssc = {x ∈ ]γ1, γ2[ | |u′(x)|= 1}.
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Given an initial condition x ∈ ]γ1, γ2[, a stopper faces the discretionary
stopping problem whose value function is given by
vds(x;γ1, γ2,Cγ1 ,Cγ2)
= sup
τ∈As
E
[∫ τ∧Tγ1∧Tγ2
0
e−Λth(Xt)dt+ e−Λτ g(Xτ )1{τ<Tγ1∧Tγ2}(9)
+ e−ΛTγ1Cγ11{Tγ1≤τ∧Tγ2} + e
−ΛTγ2Cγ21{Tγ2≤τ∧Tγ1}
]
,
where X is the solution to (1) for ξ ≡ 0. In this case, Assumptions 1 and 2 en-
sure that vds is the difference of two convex functions and identifies with the
solution, in an appropriate distributional sense, to the variational inequality
max{Lu(x) + h(x), g(x)− u(x)}= 0
with boundary conditions
u(γ1) =Cγ1 and u(γ2) =Cγ2 ,
where L is defined by (8); see Lamberton and Zervos [15], Theorems 12 and
13. In this case, the optimal stopping time τ◦ identifies with the first hitting
time of the so-called stopping region
Sds = {x ∈ ]γ1, γ2[ | u(x) = g(x)},
namely, τ◦ = inf{t≥ 0 |Xt ∈ Sds}.
Now, we consider the game where the controller has the “first-move ad-
vantage” relative to the stopper, and we assume that there exists a Marko-
vian optimal strategy (ξ∗, τ∗) for the sake of the discussion in this section.
We expect that this optimal strategy involves the same tactics as the ones
we have discussed above. From the perspective of the controller, the state
space R splits into a control region C and a waiting region Wc. Accordingly,
ξ∗ should involve minimal action to keep the state process in the closure
R \ intC of the waiting region Wc for as long as the stopper does not ter-
minate the game. Similarly, from the perspective of the stopper, the state
space R splits into a stopping region S and a waiting region Ws, and τ∗ is
the first hitting time of S .
Inside any bounded interval ]γ1, γ2[⊆Ws, the requirement that (ξ∗, τ∗)
should satisfy (5) suggests that w should identify with vssc defined by (7)
for Cγ1 =w(γ1) and Cγ2 =w(γ2). Therefore, we expect that w should satisfy
min{Lw(x) + h(x),1− |w′(x)|}= 0 inside Ws.(10)
Inside any bounded interval ]γ1, γ2[⊆Wc, the requirement that (ξ∗, τ∗) should
satisfy (5) suggests that w should identify with vds defined by (9) for Cγ1 =
w(γ1) and Cγ2 =w(γ2). Therefore, we expect that w should satisfy
max{Lw(x) + h(x), g(x)−w(x)}= 0 inside Wc.(11)
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To couple variational inequalities (10) and (11), we consider four pos-
sibilities. The region WW =Wc ∩ Ws where both players should wait is
associated with the inequalities
Lw+ h= 0, |w′|< 1 and g < w.(12)
Inside the set CW = C ∩Ws where the stopper should wait, whereas, the
controller should act, we expect that
Lw+ h≥ 0, |w′|= 1 and g < w.(13)
Inside the part of the state space WS =Wc ∩ S where the controller would
rather wait if the stopper deviated from the optimal strategy and did not
terminate the game, we expect that
Lw+ h≤ 0, |w′|< 1 and g =w.(14)
Finally, the region CS = C ∩ S in which the stopper should terminate the
game should the controller deviate from the optimal strategy and did not
act, we expect that
Lw+ h ∈R, |w′|= 1 and g ≥w.(15)
These inequalities give rise to the following definition. Here, as well as in the
rest of the paper, we denote by intΓ and cl Γ the interior and the closure of
a set Γ⊆R, respectively.
Definition 1. A candidate for the value function w is a continuous
function u :R→ R+ that is C1 with absolutely continuous first derivative
inside R \ B, where B is a finite set, satisfies
|u′(x)| ≤ 1 for all x ∈R \ B,
and has the following properties, where
C = cl[int{x ∈R \ B | |u′(x)|= 1}],
SW = {x ∈R | u(x) = g(x)}, SC = cl{x ∈R | u(x)< g(x)},
S = SW ∪ SC and W =R \ (C ∪ S).
(I) Each of the sets C, SW and SC is a finite union of intervals, and B ⊆
SC ⊆ C.
(II) u satisfies
Lu(x) + h(x)


= 0, Lebesgue-a.e. in W,
≥ 0, Lebesgue-a.e. in int(C \ S),
≡Lg(x) + h(x)≤ 0, Lebesgue-a.e. in intSW ,
∈R, Lebesgue-a.e. in intSC \ B.
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(III) If we denote by u′−(c) [resp., u′+(c)] the left-hand (resp., right-hand)
derivative of u at c ∈ B, then
either u′−(c) = 1 and u
′
+(c)< 1 or u
′
−(c)>−1 and u′+(c) =−1
for all c ∈ B.
In the following definition, we introduce some terminology we are going
to use.
Definition 2. Given a function u satisfying the conditions of Defini-
tion 1, we call the regions W , C and S waiting, control and stopping, re-
spectively. Also, we call reflecting all finite boundary points x of C such
that
u′(x− ε)< 1 and u′(x) = 1 or u′(x) =−1 and u′(x+ ε)>−1
for all ε > 0 sufficiently small, and repelling all other finite boundary points
of C.
It is worth noting that requirement (III) of Definition 1 implies that all
points in B are repelling. The special case that we solve in Section 5 involves
only reflecting boundary points. On the other hand, the special case that we
solve in Section 6 involves repelling as well as reflecting points and B 6=∅.
4. A verification theorem. Before addressing the main result on this sec-
tion, namely Theorem 1, we consider the following result, which is concerned
with the construction of the process ξ∗ that is part of the optimal strategy
associated with a given function satisfying the requirements of Definition 1.
The main idea of its proof is to paste solutions to (1) that are reflecting in
appropriate boundary points.
Lemma 1. Consider a function u :R→ R+ that satisfies the conditions
of Definition 1. There exists a controlled process ξ∗ ∈Ac such that
the set {t≥ 0 |X∗t ∈ B} is finite,(16)
X∗t ∈R \ intC for all t > 0, u(X∗t+)− u(X∗t ) =−|∆ξ∗t |=−|∆X∗t |
(17)
for all t≥ 0,
(ξ∗c)+t =
∫ t
0
1{u′(X∗s )=−1} d(ξ
∗c)+s and (ξ
∗c)−t =
∫ t
0
1{u′(X∗s )=1} d(ξ
∗c)−s
(18)
for all t≥ 0,
where X∗ is the associated solution to (1).
Proof. Given a finite interval [α,β] and a controlled process ξ ∈ Ac,
suppose that there exists a point x¯ ∈ [α,β] and an (Ft)-stopping time τ
with P(τ <∞) > 0 such that the solution to (1) is such that Xτ = x¯ on
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the event {τ <∞}. On the probability space (Ω,F ,Gt,Q), where (Gt) is the
filtration defined by Gt =Fτ+t and Q is the conditional probability measure
P(· | τ <∞) that has Radon–Nikodym derivative with respect to P given by
dQ
dP
=
1
P(τ <∞)1{τ<∞},
the process B defined by Bt = (Wτ+t − Wτ )1{τ<∞} is a standard (Gt)-
Brownian motion that is independent of G0 = Fτ ; see Revuz and Yor [20],
Exercise IV.3.21. In this context, there exist (Gt)-adapted continuous pro-
cesses X¯ and ξ¯ such that ξ¯ is a finite variation process,
X¯t = x¯+
∫ t
0
b(X¯s)ds+ ξ¯t +
∫ t
0
σ(X¯s)dBs,
X¯t ∈ [α,β], ξ¯+t =
∫ t
0
1{X¯s=α} dξ¯
+
s and ξ¯
−
t =
∫ t
0
1{X¯s=β} dξ¯
−
s ;
see El Karoui and Chaleyat-Maurel [7] and Schmidt [21]. Since (t− τ)+ is
an (Fτ+t)-stopping time, Gt = Fτ+t and B(t−τ)+ = (Wt −Wτ )1{τ<t} for all
t≥ 0,
X¯(t−τ)+ = x¯+
∫ (t−τ)+
0
b(X¯s)ds+ ξ¯(t−τ)+ +
∫ (t−τ)+
0
σ(X¯s)dBs
= x¯+
∫ t
0
b(X¯(s−τ)+)d(s− τ)+ + ξ¯(t−τ)+ +
∫ t
0
σ(X¯(s−τ)+)dB(s−τ)+
= x¯+
∫ t
0
1{τ≤s}b(X¯(s−τ)+)ds+ ξ¯(t−τ)+ +
∫ t
0
1{τ≤s}σ(X¯(s−τ)+)dWs;
see Revuz and Yor [20], Propositions V.1.4, V.1.5. Similarly we can see, for
example, that
ξ¯+(t−τ)+ =
∫ (t−τ)+
0
1{X¯s=α} dξ¯
+
s =
∫ t
0
1{X¯(s−τ)+=α} dξ¯
+
(s−τ)+ .
In view of this observation, we can see that, if we define
X˜t =
{
Xt, if t≤ τ ,
X¯t−τ , if t > τ ,
and ξ˜t =
{
ξt, if t≤ τ ,
ξ¯t−τ , if t > τ ,
(19)
then X˜ is the solution to (1) that is driven by ξ˜ ∈Ac,
X˜t ∈ [α,β], ξ˜+t − ξ˜+τ+ =
∫ t
τ
1{X˜s=α} dξ˜
+
s and
(20)
ξ˜−t − ξ˜−τ+ =
∫ t
τ
1{X˜s=β} dξ˜
−
s
for all t > τ .
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Using the same arguments and references, we can show that, given an
interval [α,∞[, a point x¯ ∈ [α,∞[, a controlled process ξ ∈Ac and an (Ft)-
stopping time τ such that the solution to (1) is such that Xτ = x¯ on the
event {τ <∞}, there exist processes X˜ and ξ˜ ∈ Ac satisfying (1) and such
that
X˜t =Xt and ξ˜t = ξt for all t≤ τ,(21)
(22)
X˜t ∈ [α,∞[, ξ˜+t − ξ˜+τ+ =
∫ t
τ
1{X˜s=α} dξ˜
+
s and ξ˜
−
t − ξ˜−τ+ = 0 for all t > τ.
Similarly, given an interval ]−∞, β], a point x¯ ∈ ]−∞, β], a controlled process
ξ ∈Ac and an (Ft)-stopping time τ such that the solution to (1) is such that
Xτ = x¯ on the event {τ <∞}, there exist processes X˜ and ξ˜ ∈Ac satisfying
(1) and such that
X˜t =Xt and ξ˜t = ξt for all t≤ τ,(23)
(24)
X˜t ∈ ]−∞, β], ξ˜+t − ξ˜+τ+ = 0 and ξ˜−t − ξ˜−τ+ =
∫ t
τ
1{X˜s=β} dξ˜
−
s for all t > τ.
Given a function u that satisfies the requirements of Definition 1, we now
use the notation and the terminology introduced by Definitions 1 and 2
to iteratively construct a process ξ∗ ∈ Ac such that (16)–(18) hold true by
means of the constructions above. To this end, we introduce the following
notation, which is illustrated by Figure 1. If intC 6= ∅ and x ∈ C, then we
Fig. 1. Illustration of the functions ζ, ℓ, r appearing in the proof of Lemma 1. The
vertical solid lines also demarcate the region C.
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recall that we use u′−(x) [resp., u′+(x)] to denote the left-hand (resp., the
right-hand) first derivative of u at x, we define
ζ(x) =
{
sup{y < x | y /∈ C}, if u′−(x) = 1,
inf{y > x | y /∈ C}, if u′+(x) =−1 and u′−(x)< 1,
and we note that ζ(x) ∈R because u is real-valued. On the other hand, given
any x ∈R, we define
ℓ(x) = sup{y < x | y ∈ intC} and r(x) = inf{y > x | y ∈ intC},
with the usual conventions that sup∅=−∞ and inf∅=∞. The algorithm
that we now develop terminates after finite iterations because each of the
sets C, W is a finite union of intervals.
STEP 0: Initialization. We consider the following four possibilities that
can happen, depending on the initial condition x of (1):
If intC 6=∅ and x ∈ intC (e.g., see the points x2, x3, x4 in Figure 1), then
we define ξ0t = ζ(x)− x for all t > 0. If we denote by X0 the corresponding
solution to (1), and we set τ0 = 0, then X
0 has a single jump at time τ0,
u(X00+)− u(X00 ) = u(ζ(x))− u(x) =−|ζ(x)− x|=−|∆ξ00 |,
if ζ(x)<x, then X0τ0+ =X
0
0+ = ζ(x) = r(ζ(x)) = r(X
0
0+) is reflecting
and if x < ζ(x), then X0τ0+ =X
0
0+ = ζ(x) = ℓ(ζ(x)) = ℓ(X
0
0+) is reflecting.
In this case, X0 ∈ B if x ∈ B ⊆ C.
If ℓ(x) =−∞ and r(x) =∞, which is the case if intC =∅, then we define
ξ0 = 0, we denote byX0 the corresponding solution to (1), and we let τ0 =∞.
If intC 6= ∅, x ∈ R \ intC and either of ℓ(x), r(x) is reflecting (e.g., see
the points x1, x5 in Figure 1), then we define ξ
0 = 0, we denote by X0 the
corresponding solution to (1), and we set τ0 = 0.
If intC 6=∅, x ∈R \ intC, and both ℓ(x), r(x) are repelling if finite (e.g.,
see the point x6 in Figure 1), then we consider the (Ft)-stopping times
Tℓ(x) = inf{t≥ 0 |X†t ≤ ℓ(x)}, Tr(x) = inf{t≥ 0 |X†t ≥ r(x)},
where X† is the solution to (1) for ξ = 0, and we set
ξ0t = [ζ(ℓ(x))− ℓ(x)]1{Tℓ(x)<Tr(x)∧t} + [ζ(r(x))− r(x)]1{Tr(x)<Tℓ(x)∧t},
in which expression, we define ζ(ℓ(x))− ℓ(x) [resp., ζ(r(x))− r(x)] arbitrar-
ily if ℓ(x) = −∞ [resp., r(x) =∞]. If we denote by X0 the corresponding
solution to (1), and we set τ0 = Tr(x) ∧ Tℓ(x), then X0 has a single jump at
the (Ft)-stopping time τ0,
X0t ∈R \ intC and u(X0t+)− u(X0t ) =−|∆ξ0t | for all t≤ τ0,
on the event {Tℓ(x) < Tr(x)} ∈ Fτ0 , the point X0τ0+ = ζ(ℓ(x)) is reflecting
and on the event {Tr(x) <Tℓ(x)} ∈ Fτ0 , the point X0τ0+ = ζ(r(x)) is reflec-
ting.
In this case, we may have X0τ0 ∈ B but X0τ0+ /∈ B and X0t /∈ B for all t < τ0.
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STEP 1: Induction hypothesis. We assume that we have determined an
(Ft)-stopping time τj , and we have constructed a process ξj ∈Ac such that,
if we denote by Xj the associated solution to (1), then (16)–(18) are satisfied
for ξj , Xj in place of ξ∗, X∗ and for all t≤ τj instead of all positive t. Also,
we assume that, if P(τj <∞)> 0, then one of the following two possibilities
occur:
(I) there exists a point xj such that Xjτj = x
j on the event {τj <∞};
(II) there exist points xj1, x
j
2 ∈R and events Aj1,Aj2 ∈ Fτj forming a par-
tition of {τj <∞} such that P(Ajk)> 0, Xjτj+ = xjk on the event Ajk and at
least one of ℓ(xjk), r(x
j
k) is finite and reflecting, for k = 1,2.
Step 0 provides such a construction for j = 0. In particular, the last pos-
sibility there gives rise to Case (II) for
A01 = {Tℓ(x) < Tr(x)}, A02 = {Tr(x) < Tℓ(x)},
x01 = ζ(ℓ(x)) and x
0
2 = ζ(r(x)).
On the other hand, the second possibility there is such that P(τj <∞) = 0,
while the remaining two possibilities give rise to Case (I).
STEP 2. If P(τj <∞) = 0, then define ξ∗ = ξj , X∗ =Xj and stop. Oth-
erwise, we proceed to the next step.
STEP 3. We address the situation arising in the context of Case (II)
of Step 1; the analysis regarding Case (I) is simpler and follows exactly
the same steps. To this end, we first consider the (Ft)-stopping time τˆ =
τj1Aj1
+∞1
Aj2
, and we note that Xjτˆ = x
j
1 on the event {τˆ <∞}. We are
faced with the following possible cases.
If both of ℓ(xj1), r(x
j
1) are finite and reflecting, then we appeal to the
construction associated with (19)–(20) for ξ = ξj , X =Xj , x¯= xj1 and τ = τˆ
to obtain processes ξ˜, X˜ that are equal to ξj , Xj up to time τˆ and satisfy
(20) for all t > τˆ . We then define
ξj+1 = ξ˜, Xj+1 = X˜ and τj+1 =∞1Aj1 + τj1Aj2 .
The result of this construction is such that Xj+1τj+1+ = x
j
2 on the event {τj+1 <
∞}=Aj2, which puts us in the context of Case (I) of Step 1.
If ℓ(xj1) is finite and reflecting and r(x
j
1) =∞ [resp., ℓ(xj1) = −∞ and
r(xj1) is finite and reflecting], then we proceed in the same way using the
construction associated with (21)–(22) [resp., (23)–(24)].
If ℓ(xj1) is finite and reflecting and r(x
j
1) is finite and repelling, then we
consider (21)–(22) and, as above, we construct processes ξ˜, X˜ that are equal
to ξj , Xj up to time τˆ and satisfy (22) for all t > τˆ . We then consider the
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(Ft)-stopping time τˆ † and the process ξj+1 ∈Ac given by
τˆ † = inf{t≥ τˆ | X˜t ≥ r(xj1)} and
ξj+1t =
{
ξ˜t, if t≤ τˆ †,
ξ˜τˆ† + ζ(r(x
j
1))− r(xj1), if t > τˆ †,
we denote by Xj+1 the associated solution to (1), and we define
τj+1 = τˆ
†
1
Aj1
+ τj1Aj2
, Aj+11 = {τˆ † <∞}, Aj+12 =Aj2,
xj+1i = ζ(r(x
j
1)) and x
j+1
2 = x
j
2.
In this case, we may have Xτj+1 ∈ B but Xτj+1+ /∈ B and Xt /∈ B for all
t ∈ ]τj, τj+1[.
Finally, if ℓ(xj1) is finite and repelling, and r(x
j
1) is finite and reflecting,
then we are faced with a construction that is symmetric to the very last one
using (23)–(24).
STEP 4. Go back to Step 2. 
We now prove the main result of the section. It is worth noting that we can
relax significantly assumptions (27)–(28). However, we have opted against
any such relaxation because (a) this would require a considerable amount
of extra arguments of a technical nature that would obscure the main ideas
of the proof, and (b) (27)–(28) are plainly satisfied in the special cases that
we explicitly solve in Sections 5 and 6.
Theorem 1. Consider a function u :R→ R+ that satisfies the con-
ditions of Definition 1, let ξ∗ ∈ Ac be the control strategy constructed in
Lemma 1, let X∗ be the associated solution to (1) and define
v(y) =max{u(y), g(y)} and w(y) = u(y) for y ∈R.(25)
Also, given any ξ ∈Ac, define
τ∗v = τ
∗
v (ξ) = inf{t≥ 0 |Xt ∈ S},
(26)
τ∗w = τ
∗
w(ξ) = inf{t≥ 0 |Xt+ ∈ S},
where X is the associated solution to (1), and note that τ∗v ∨ τ∗w = τ∗w. In this
context, the following statements are true:
(I) Jvx(ξ
∗, τ)≤ v(x) and Jwx (ξ∗, τ)≤ w(x) for all τ ∈ As and all initial
conditions of (1).
(II) v(x) = Jvx(ξ
∗, τ∗v ) and w(x) = Jwx (ξ∗, τ∗w) for every initial condition
x of (1) such that
sup
t≥0
u(X∗t )≤K1(27)
for some constant K1 =K1(x).
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(III) If there exists a constant K2 such that
u(y)≤K2 for all y ∈R \ S,(28)
then v(x) ≤ Jvx(ξ, τ∗v ) and w(x) ≤ Jwx (ξ, τ∗w) for every initial condition x
of (1).
(IV) If u satisfies (28), then (ξ∗, τ∗v ) [resp., (ξ∗, τ∗w)] is an optimal strategy
for the game with performance criterion given by (2) [resp., (3)] and v and
w are the value functions of the two games.
Proof. Given a function u satisfying the conditions of Definition 1, we
denote by u′′ the unique, Lebesgue-a.e., first derivative of u′ in R \ B, and
we define u′′(x), u′(x) arbitrarily for x in the finite set B. In view of (16),
we can use Itoˆ’s formula and the integration by parts formula to calculate
e−ΛT u(X∗T ) = u(x) +
∫ T
0
e−ΛtLu(X∗t )dt+
∫
[0,T [
e−Λtu′(X∗t )dξt
+
∑
0≤t<T
e−Λt [u(X∗t+)− u(X∗t )− u′(X∗t )∆X∗t ] +M∗T ,
where
M∗T =
∫ T
0
e−Λtσ(X∗t )u
′(X∗t )dWt.(29)
Rearranging terms and using (17)–(18), we obtain∫ T
0
e−Λth(X∗t )dt+
∫
[0,T [
e−Λt dξˇ∗t + e
−ΛT u(X∗T )
= u(x) +
∫ T
0
e−Λt [Lu(X∗t ) + h(X∗t )]dt+
∫ T
0
e−Λt [1 + u′(X∗t )]d(ξ
∗c)+t
+
∫ T
0
e−Λt [1− u′(X∗t )]d(ξ∗c)−t
+
∑
0≤t<T
e−Λt [u(X∗t+)− u(X∗t ) + |∆X∗t |] +M∗T
= u(x) +
∫ T
0
e−Λt [Lu(X∗t ) + h(X∗t )]dt+M∗T .
It follows that, given any finite (Ft)-stopping time τˆ ,∫ τˆ
0
e−Λth(X∗t )dt+
∫
[0,τˆ [
e−Λt dξˇ∗t + e
−Λτˆ g(X∗τˆ )
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= u(x) + e−Λτˆ [g(X∗τˆ )− u(X∗τˆ )] +
∫ τˆ
0
e−Λt [Lu(X∗t ) + h(X∗t )]dt+M∗τˆ
(30)
= u(x)1{0<τˆ} + e−Λτˆ [g(X∗τˆ )− u(X∗τˆ )]1{0<τˆ} + g(x)1{τˆ=0}
+
∫ τˆ
0
e−Λt [Lu(X∗t ) + h(X∗t )]dt+M∗τˆ .
Similarly, we can calculate∫ τˆ
0
e−Λth(X∗t )dt+
∫
[0,τˆ ]
e−Λt dξˇ∗t + e
−Λτˆ g(X∗τˆ+)
= u(x) + e−Λτˆ [g(X∗τˆ+)− u(X∗τˆ+)](31)
+
∫ τˆ
0
e−Λt [Lu(X∗t ) + h(X∗t )]dt+M∗τˆ .
Combining (30) with (17) and the facts that 0 ≤ g(x) ≤ u(x) for all x ∈
R \ C = int(W ∪ SW) and Lu(x) + h(x) ≤ 0 Lebesgue-a.e. in R \ C, we can
see that, given any T > 0 and any (Ft)-stopping time τ ,∫ T∧τ
0
e−Λth(X∗t )dt+
∫
[0,T∧τ [
e−Λt dξˇ∗t + e
−Λτ g(X∗τ )1{τ≤T}
(32)
≤ u(x)1{0<τ} + g(x)1{τ=0} +M∗T∧τ ≤ v(x) +M∗T∧τ ,
the last inequality following thanks to (25). These inequalities and the
positivity of h, g imply that the stopped process M∗τ is a supermartin-
gale and E[M∗T∧τ ] ≤ 0. Therefore, we can take expectations in (32) and
pass to the limit T →∞ using Fatou’s lemma to obtain the inequality
Jvx(ξ
∗, τ) ≤max{u(x), g(x)} = v(x). With reasoning similar to (31), we de-
rive the inequality Jwx (ξ
∗, τ)≤ u(x) =w(x), and (I) follows.
To prove (II), we consider the (Ft)-stopping time τ∗v defined by (26) with
X∗ instead of X , and we note that
X∗t ∈ clW =R \ int(C ∪ S) for all 0< t≤ τ∗v .
Combining this observation and the definition of τ∗v with the facts that
g(x) ≤ u(x) = v(x) for all x ∈W and v(x) = g(x) for all x ∈ S , we can see
that
u(X∗τ∗v )1{τ∗v>0} = g(X
∗
τ∗v
)1{τ∗v>0},
v(x)1{τ∗v=0} = g(x)1{τ∗v=0} and v(x)1{τ∗v>0} = u(x)1{τ∗v>0}.
In view of these observations, (30) and the fact that Lu(x) + h(x) = 0
Lebesgue-a.e. in W , we can see that, given any T > 0,∫ T∧τ∗v
0
e−Λth(X∗t )dt+
∫
[0,T∧τ∗v [
e−Λt dξˇ∗t + e
−Λτ∗v g(X∗τ∗v )1{τ∗v≤T}
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+ e−ΛT u(X∗T )1{T<τ∗v }
= u(x)1{0<τ∗v } + e
−Λτ∗v [g(X∗τ∗v )− u(X∗τ∗v )]1{0<τ∗v≤T} + g(x)1{τ∗v=0}
+M∗T∧τ∗v
= v(x) +M∗T∧τ∗v .
If we denote by (̺n) a localizing sequence for the stopped local martingale
M∗τ
∗
v such that ̺n > 0 for all n ≥ 1, then we can see that these identities
imply that
E
[∫ ̺n∧τ∗v
0
e−Λth(X∗t )dt+
∫
[0,̺n∧τ∗v [
e−Λt dξˇ∗t + e
−Λτ∗v g(X∗τ∗v )1{τ∗v≤̺n}
+ e−Λ̺nu(X∗̺n)1{̺n<τ∗}
]
= v(x).
In view of (27) and Assumption 2, we can pass to the limit as n→∞
using the monotone and the dominated convergence theorems to obtain
Jvx(ξ
∗, τ∗) =max{u(x), g(x)}= v(x).
We can use (31) and the observations that
X∗t ∈ clW =R \ int(C ∪ S) for all 0< t≤ τ∗w and u(X∗τ∗w+) = g(X∗τ∗w+)
to show that Jwx (ξ
∗, τ∗) = u(x) =w(x) similarly.
To establish Part (III), we consider any admissible ξ ∈ Ac and we note
that (30) remains true with ξ, X instead of ξ∗, X∗ if τˆ is replaced by τˆ ∧ τ∗v
because B ⊆ S . Also, we note that
Xt ∈R \ S = (W ∪C) \ S for all t < τ∗v .(33)
In view of the facts that g(x) ≤ u(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ R \ S and u(x) ≤
g(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ S , we can see that this observation and the definition
of τ∗v imply that
u(Xτ∗v )1{τ∗v>0} ≤ g(Xτ∗v )1{τ∗v>0},
v(x)1{τ∗v=0} = g(x)1{τ∗v=0} and v(x)1{τ∗v>0} = u(x)1{τ∗v>0}.
Combining these observations with the fact that Lu(x)+h(x)≥ 0 Lebesgue-
a.e. inside int[(W∪C)\S], we can see that (30) implies that, given any T > 0,∫ T∧τ∗v
0
e−Λth(Xt)dt+
∫
[0,T∧τ∗v [
e−Λt dξˇt + e−Λτ∗v g(Xτ∗v )1{τ∗v≤T}
+ e−ΛT u(XT )1{T<τ∗v }
≥ u(x)1{0<τ∗v } + e−Λτ∗v [g(Xτ∗v )− u(Xτ∗v )]1{0<τ∗v≤T} + g(x)1{τ∗v=0}
+MT∧τ∗v
≥ v(x) +MT∧τ∗v ,
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whereM is defined as in (29). If (̺n) is a localizing sequence for the stopped
local martingale M τ
∗
v such that ̺n > 0 for all n≥ 1, then these inequalities
imply that
E
[∫ ̺n∧τ∗v
0
e−Λth(Xt)dt+
∫
[0,̺n∧τ∗v [
e−Λt dξˇt + e−Λτ∗v g(Xτ∗v )1{τ∗v≤̺n}
+ e−Λ̺nu(X∗̺n)1{̺n<τ∗}
]
≥ v(x).
In view of (28) and Assumption 2, we can pass to the limit as n→∞
using the monotone and the dominated convergence theorems to obtain
Jvx(ξ, τ
∗)≥max{u(x), g(x)} = v(x).
In general, the inequality τ∗v ≤ τ∗w may be strict because, for example, we
may have x ∈ S and x+∆ξ0 ∈R\S . In such a case, the set {t ∈ [0, τ∗w[ |Xt ∈
B} may not be empty, but it is finite. Therefore, we can use Itoˆ’s formula
to derive (30) with ξ, X instead of ξ∗, X∗ and with τˆ ∧ τ∗v replacing τˆ .
Combining this result with the observations that
Xt ∈ cl(R \ S) for all 0< t < τ∗w and u(Xτ∗w+)≤ g(Xτ∗w+),
we can derive the inequality Jwx (ξ, τ
∗)≥ u(x) =w(x) as above.
Finally, Part (IV) follows immediately from Parts (I)–(III). 
Remark 1. An inspection of the proof of Theorem 1 reveals that the
optimal strategy (ξ∗, τ∗w) of the game where the controller has the first-move
advantage is highly nonunique. Indeed, in the presence of (28), (ξ∗, τ˜∗w),
where τ˜∗w is any (Ft)-stopping time such that X∗τ˜∗w+1{τ˜∗w<∞} ∈ S , in partic-
ular, (ξ∗,∞), is also an optimal strategy. It is worth noting that a similar
observation cannot be made for the game where the stopper has the first-
move advantage. Both of the special cases considered in the following two
sections provide cases illustrating this situation; see Propositions 4, 5, 7
and 8.
5. The explicit solution to a special case with quadratic reward functions.
We now derive the explicit solution to the special case of the general problem
that arises when
b(x) = 0, σ(x) = 1, δ¯(x) = δ, h(x) = κx2 + µ and
g(x) = λx2 for all x ∈R,
for some constants δ, κ,λ > 0 and µ ≥ 0. In our analysis, we exploit the
symmetry around the origin that the problem has, we consider only sets
Γ⊆ R such that {−x | x ∈ Γ}= Γ and we denote Γ+ = Γ ∩ [0,∞[. Also, we
recall that the general solution to the ODE
Lf(x) + h(x)≡ 12f ′′(x)− δf(x) + κx2 + µ= 0
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is given by
f(x) =A cosh
√
2δx+B sinh
√
2δx+
κ
δ
x2 +
κ+ δµ
δ2
for some constants A,B ∈R.
In the special case that we consider in this section, the controller should
exert effort to keep the state process close to the origin. On the other hand,
the stopper should terminate the game if the state process is sufficiently far
from the origin. In view of these observations, we derive optimal strategies
by considering functions satisfying the requirements of Definition 1 that are
associated with the regions
S+ = [α,∞[, C+ = [β,∞[ and W+ = [0, α∧ β[(34)
for some constants α,β > 0; see Definition 1. In particular, we derive three
qualitatively different cases that are characterized by the relations β < α,
α < β or α= β, depending on parameter values; see Figures 2–4 as well as
Remark 2.
In this context, Theorem 1 implies that the associated optimal strategies
can be described informally as follows. The controlled process ξ∗ has an
initial jump equal to −(x+ β) [resp., −(x− β)] if the initial condition x of
(1) is such that x < −β (resp., x > β). Beyond time 0, ξ∗ is such that the
associated solution to (1) is reflecting in −β in the positive direction and in
β in the negative direction. On the other hand, the optimal stopping times
τ∗v , τ∗w are the first hitting times of S as defined by (26). In view of these
observations, we focus on the construction of the function u satisfying the
requirements of Definition 1 in what follows.
In the first case that we consider, u identifies with the value function
of the singular stochastic control problem that arises if the stopper never
terminates the game (see Figure 2). In particular, we look for a solution to
the variational inequality
min{12u′′(x)− δu(x) + κx2 + µ,1− |u′(x)|}= 0(35)
of the form
u(x) =
{
A cosh
√
2δx+
κ
δ
x2 +
κ+ δµ
δ2
, if |x| ≤ β,
x− β + u(β), if |x|> β.
(36)
The requirement that u should be C2 along the free-boundary point β,
which is associated with the so-called “principle of smooth fit” of singular
stochastic control, implies that the parameter A should be given by
A=− κ
δ2 cosh
√
2δβ
,(37)
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Fig. 2. The functions v and w in the context of Proposition 2 (β < α).
while β > 0 should satisfy
tanh
√
2δβ =
δ(2κβ − δ)
κ
√
2δ
.(38)
We also define α> 0 to be the unique solution to the equation
u(α) = λα2.(39)
We prove the following result, as well as the other ones we consider in
this section, in Appendix I.
Proposition 2. Equation (38) has a unique solution β > 0, which is
strictly greater than δ2κ , while equation (39) has a unique solution α > 0.
Furthermore, α > β if and only if
δλ− κ < 0 or δλ− κ= 0 and µ> 0
(40)
or δλ− κ > 0 and tanh
√
2δµ
δλ− κ <
√
2δµ
δλ− κ −
δ2
κ
√
2δ
,
in which case, α > 12λ and the function u defined by (36) for A< 0, given
by (37), satisfies the conditions of Definition 1; see Figure 2 for a depiction
of the value functions v and w.
We next consider the possibility that the value function of the game where
the stopper has the “first-move advantage” identifies with the value function
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Fig. 3. The functions v and w in the context of Proposition 3 (α< β = 1
2λ
).
of the optimal stopping problem that arises if the controller never acts; see
Figure 3. In this case, we look for a solution to the variational inequality
max{12v′′(x)− δv(x) + κx2 + µ,λx2 − v(x)}= 0
of the form
v(x) =
{
A cosh
√
2δx+
κ
δ
x2 +
κ+ δµ
δ2
, if |x| ≤ α,
λx2, if |x|> α.
(41)
The requirement that v should be C1 along the free-boundary point α, which
is associated with the so-called “principle of smooth fit” of optimal stopping,
implies that the parameter A should be given by
A=
δ(δλ− κ)α2 − (κ+ δµ)
δ2 cosh
√
2δα
,(42)
while α> 0 should satisfy
tanh
√
2δα=
√
2δ(δλ− κ)α
δ(δλ− κ)α2 − (κ+ δµ) .(43)
In this context, the function u defined by
u(x) =


A cosh
√
2δx+
κ
δ
x2 +
κ+ δµ
δ2
, if |x| ≤ α,
λx2, if |x| ∈
]
α,
1
2λ
]
,
1
4λ
, if |x|> 1
2λ
,
(44)
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provides an appropriate choice for a function satisfying the requirements of
Definition 1 as long as α < 12λ .
Proposition 3. Suppose that δλ− κ > 0. Equation (43) has a unique
solution α > 0, which is strictly greater than
√
κ+δµ
δ(δλ−κ) . This solution is less
than or equal to 12λ if and only if
1
2λ
>
√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ) and tanh
√
2δ
2λ
≥
√
2δ(δλ− κ)λ
δ(δλ− κ)− 4(κ+ δµ)λ2 ,(45)
in which case, the function u defined by (44) for A> 0, given by (42), sat-
isfies the requirements of Definition 1; see Figure 3 for a depiction of the
value functions v and w.
The third case that we consider “bridges” the previous two and is char-
acterized by the fact that the free-boundary points α, β may coincide in a
generic way. In particular, we look for a function u satisfying the require-
ments of Definition 1 that is given by
u(x) =
{
A cosh
√
2δx+
κ
δ
x2 +
κ+ δµ
δ2
, if |x| ≤ α,
x− α+ u(α), if |x|>α,
(46)
for some α> 0, and satisfies
u(α) = λα2;(47)
see Figure 4. The requirements that u should satisfy (47) and be C1 at α
imply that the parameter A should be given by
A=
δ(δλ− κ)α2 − (κ+ δµ)
δ2 cosh
√
2δα
,(48)
while the free-boundary point α > 0 should satisfy
tanh
√
2δα=
δ(δ − 2κα)√
2δ[δ(δλ− κ)α2 − (κ+ δµ)] .(49)
Proposition 4. Suppose that δλ− κ > 0 and
√
κ+δµ
δ(δλ−κ) 6= δ2κ . Equation
(49) has a unique solution α > 0 such that
if
δ
2κ
<
√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ) , then
1
2λ
<
δ
2κ
< α <
√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ) ,(50)
while
if
√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ) <
δ
2κ
, then
√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ) < α<
δ
2κ
.(51)
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Fig. 4. The functions v and w in the context of Propositions 4 and 5 (α= β).
If the parameters are such that (50) is true, then the function u defined by
(46) for A< 0, given by (48), satisfies the conditions of Definition 1 if and
only if
tanh
√
2δµ
δλ− κ ≥
√
2δµ
δλ− κ −
δ2
κ
√
2δ
.(52)
On the other hand, if the parameters are such that (51) is true, then 12λ < α
if and only if
1
2λ
≤
√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ) or(53)
1
2λ
>
√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ) and tanh
√
2δ
2λ
<
√
2δ(δλ− κ)λ
δ(δλ− κ)− 4(κ+ δµ)λ2 ,
in which case, the function u defined by (46) for A> 0, given by (48), satis-
fies the conditions of Definition 1; see Figure 4 for a depiction of the value
functions v and w.
The results that we have established thus far involve mutually exclusive
conditions on the problem data. To exhaust all possible parameter values,
we need to consider the following result that is associated with the regions
B = SW =∅, C+ = S+C =
[
δ
2κ
,∞
[
and W+ =
[
0,
δ
2κ
[
,(54)
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which are consistent with (34) for α = β = δ2κ , and the proof of which is
straightforward.
Proposition 5. Suppose that δλ−κ > 0 and
√
κ+δµ
δ(δλ−κ) =
δ
2κ . The func-
tion u defined by
u(x) =


κ
δ
x2 +
κ+ δµ
δ2
, if |x| ≤ δ
2κ
,
x− δ
2κ
+
λδ2
4κ2
, if |x|> δ
2κ
,
(55)
is a C1 function that satisfies the requirements of Definition 1.
Remark 2. Suppose that δλ−κ > 0. The conditions differentiating be-
tween the different cases we have considered are mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive in the sense that they cover the entire range of possible parameter
values. To see this claim, we define
Q1 =
√
2δµ
δλ− κ −
δ2
κ
√
2δ
, Q2 =
√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ)
and
Q3 =
√
2δ(δλ− κ)λ
δ(δλ− κ)− 4(κ+ δµ)λ2 =
2λ√
2δ(1− 4λ2Q22)
.(56)
In view of the implications
Q1 > 0 ⇒ δ
2κ
<Q2 and Q2 <
1
2λ
⇔ 0<Q3,
we can see that the following table summarizes the conditions of Proposi-
tions 2, 3, 4 and 5:
Proposition 2 (β < α) tanh
√
2δµ
δλ−κ <Q1
Proposition 3 (α < β = 12λ)
1
2λ >Q2 and tanh
√
2δ
2λ >Q3
Propositions 4, 5 (β = α) δ2κ <Q2 and tanh
√
2δµ
δλ−κ >Q1
or 12λ ≤Q2
or 12λ >Q2 and tanh
√
2δ
2λ <Q3
For instance, if
δ = 4, κ= 1, λ= 12 and µ= 9,
then Q1 = 2
√
2, and we are in the context of Proposition 2 if
δ = 2, κ= 1100 , λ=
1
2 and µ= 0,
A ZERO-SUM GAME 25
then 12λ = 1 >
1√
198
= Q2, tanh
√
2δ
2λ ≃ 0.9640 > 0.5025 ≃ 99197 = Q3, and we
are in the context of Proposition 3 if
δ = 2, κ= 199300 , λ=
1
2 and µ= 0,
then 12λ = 1>
√
199
202 =Q2, tanh
√
2δ
2λ = tanh2<
101
3 =Q3, and we are in the
context of Proposition 4, while if
δ = 12 , κ=
1
8 , λ=
1
2 and µ= 0,
then 12λ = 1<
√
2 =Q2, and we are again in the context of Proposition 4.
6. A special case with value functions that are not C1. We now solve
the special case of the general problem that arises when
b≡ 0, σ ≡ 1, δ¯ ≡ δ, h≡ 0 and
g(x) =
{
−λx2 + λ, if |x| ∈ [0,1],
0, if |x|> 1,
for some constants δ,λ > 0. In this context, the controller has no incentive to
exert any control action other than to counter the stopper’s action because
h≡ 0. We therefore solve the problem by first viewing the game from the
stopper’s perspective. Also, we exploit the problem’s symmetry around the
origin in the same way as in the previous section.
We first consider the possibility that a function u satisfying the require-
ments of Definition 1 identifies with the value function of the optimal stop-
ping problem that arises if the controller never takes any action. To this end,
we look for a solution to the variational inequality
max{12u′′(x)− δu(x),−λx2 + λ− u(x)}= 0
of the form
u(x) =
{−λx2+ λ, if |x| ≤ α,
Ae−
√
2δx, if |x|>α,(57)
for some constants A and α ∈ ]0,1[. A function of this form is associated
with the regions
B = C = SC =∅, S+W = [0, α] and W+ =]α,∞[,(58)
and is depicted by Figure 5. To determine the constant A and the free-
boundary point α, we appeal to the so-called “principle of smooth-fit” of
optimal stopping. We therefore require that u is C1 at −α and α to obtain
A= λ(1− α2)e
√
2δα and α=− 1√
2δ
+
√
1
2δ
+ 1.(59)
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Fig. 5. The functions v and w in the context of Proposition 6.
In this case, Theorem 1 implies that the associated optimal strategy can
be described informally as follows. The controller should never act (i.e.,
ξ∗ = 0), while the stopper should terminate the game as soon as the state
process takes values in S = [−α,α] (i.e., τ∗v = τ∗u is the first hitting time of
[−α,α]).
We prove the following result, as well as the other ones we consider in
this section, in Appendix II.
Proposition 6. The function u defined by (57) for A > 0, α ∈ ]0,1[
given by (59) satisfies the requirements of Definition 1 if and only if
α≤ 1
2λ
⇔ λ≤ 1
2
(
− 1√
2δ
+
√
1
2δ
+1
)−1
;(60)
see Figure 5 for a depiction of the value functions v and w.
If the problem data is such that (60) is not true, then we consider the pos-
sibility that an optimal strategy is characterized by a function u satisfying
the requirements of Definition 1 that is associated with the regions
B+ = {β}, S+W = [0, β], C+ = S+C = [β,α] and
(61)
W+ = ]α,∞[
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Fig. 6. The functions v and w in the context of Proposition 7.
for some 0≤ β < α < 1, and is depicted by Figure 6. In particular, we con-
sider the function
u(x) =


−λx2 + λ, if |x| ≤ β,
−x− λα2 +α+ λ, if |x| ∈ ]β,α],
Ae−
√
2δx, if |x|> α.
(62)
The requirement that u should be continuous at β yields
λβ2 − β = λα2 − α,(63)
while, the requirement that u should be C1 along −α, α, implies that
A= λ(1−α2)e
√
2δα and α=
√
1− 1
λ
√
2δ
.(64)
In view of Theorem 1, we can describe informally the associated optimal
strategy as follows. If the initial condition x of (1) belongs to ]−β,β[, then
the controller should wait until the uncontrolled state process hits {−β,β},
at which time, the controller should apply an impulse to instantaneously
reposition the state process at −α or α, whichever point is closest. As soon
as the state process takes values in ]−∞,−α] (resp., [α,∞[), the controller
should exert minimal effort to reflect the state process in −α in the negative
direction (resp., in α in the positive direction). On the other hand, the
stopper should terminate the game as soon as the state process takes values
in S = [−α,α].
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Proposition 7. The point α defined by (64) is strictly greater than 12λ ,
and there exists β ∈ [0, α[ satisfying (63) if and only if
1
2
(
− 1√
2δ
+
√
1
2δ
+ 1
)−1
< λ≤
(
− 1√
2δ
+
√
1
8δ
+1
)−1
,(65)
in which case, β < 12λ . If the problem data satisfy these inequalities, then the
function u defined by (62), for A > 0, α ∈ ]0,1[ given by (64), satisfies the
conditions of Definition 1; see Figure 6 for a depiction of the value functions
v and w.
The final possibility that may arise is associated with the regions
B = {0}, SW =∅, C+ = S+C = [0, α] and W+ =]α,∞[(66)
for some α ∈ ]0,1[, and is depicted by Figure 7. In this case, a function u
satisfying the requirements of Definition 1 is given by
u(x) =
{−x− λα2 +α+ λ, if |x| ∈ [0, α],
Ae−
√
2δx, if |x|> α.(67)
The constant A and the free-boundary point α are characterized by the
requirement that u should be C1 along −α, α, and are given by (64).
In this case, Theorem 1 implies that the associated optimal strategy can
be described informally as follows. The controlled process ξ∗ has an initial
jump equal to −(x + α) [resp., −(x − α)] if the initial condition x of (1)
Fig. 7. The functions v and w in the context of Proposition 8.
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is such that x ∈ ]−α,0] (resp., x ∈ ]0, α]). Beyond time 0, ξ∗ is such that
the associated solution to (1) is reflecting in −α in the negative direction if
X∗0+ ≤−α and in α in the positive direction if X∗0+ ≥ α. On the other hand,
the stopping time τ∗v = τ∗v is the first hitting time of S = [−α,α].
Proposition 8. The function u defined by (62) for A > 0, α ∈ ]0,1[
given by (64) satisfies the conditions of Definition 1 if and only if(
− 1√
2δ
+
√
1
8δ
+1
)−1
<λ;(68)
see Figure 7 for a depiction of the value functions v and w.
APPENDIX I: PROOFS OF RESULTS IN SECTION 5
Proof of Proposition 2. It is straightforward to see that equation
(38) has a unique solution β > 0 and that this solution is strictly greater
than δ2κ . In particular, we can verify that
tanh
√
2δx− δ(2κx− δ)
κ
√
2δ
{
> 0, for all x ∈ [0, β[,
< 0, for all x ∈ ]β,∞[.(69)
For this value of β and for A< 0 given by (37), the function u defined by
(36) is C2 and satisfies the variational inequality (35) because
|u′(x)| ≤ 1 for all |x| ∈ [0, β],(70)
Lu(x) + h(x)≡ 12u′′(x)− δu(x) + κx2 + µ
(71)
≥ 0 for all |x| ∈ [β,∞[.
To see (70), we first note that u′′′(x) = (2δ)3/2A sinh
√
2δx < 0 for all x ∈
[0, β[, which implies that the restriction of u′′ in [0, β] is strictly decreasing.
Combining this observation with the identities
u′′(0) =
2κ
δ
(
1− 1
cosh
√
2δβ
)
> 0 and u′′(β) = 0,
we can see that u′′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, β[. It follows that u is an even
convex function, which, combined with the identities u′(0) = 0 and u′(β) = 1,
implies (70).
To prove (71), it suffices to show that
f0(x)≥ 0 for all x≥ β,(72)
where
f0(x) =
1
2u
′′(x)− δu(x) + κx2 + µ= κx2 − δx+ δβ − δu(β) + µ.
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The definition and the C2 continuity of u imply that f0(β) = 0, for x≥ 0.
Combining this observation with the inequality f ′0(x) = 2κ(x− δ2κ)> 0 for all
x≥ β, which follows from the fact that β > δ2κ , we can see that (72) is true.
To see that equation (39) has a unique solution α > 0, we define f1(x) =
λx2 − u(x). In view of the calculations
f ′′′1 (x) =−(2δ)3/2A sinh
√
2δx > 0 for x < β and
f ′′1 (x) = 2λx > 0 for x > β,
we can see that either f1 is convex, or there exists x1 ∈ ]0, β[ such that
f ′′1 (x) < 0 for all x < x1 and f
′′
1 (x) > 0 for all x > x1. In the first case,
f ′1(x) > 0 for all x > 0, while, in the second case, there exists x2 > x1 such
that f ′1(x)< 0 for all x ∈ ]0, x2[ and f ′1(x)> 0 for all x > x2 because f ′1(0) = 0.
In either case, we can see that the equation f1(x) = 0 has a unique solution
α > 0 because
f1(0) =− κ
δ2
(
1− 1
cosh
√
2δβ
)
− µ
δ
< 0 and lim
x→∞f1(x) =∞.
To show that the point α defined by (39) is strictly greater than β if and
only if (40) is true, we note that the linearity of u in [β,∞[ implies that there
exists α > β such that (39) is true if and only if u(β)> λβ2. In particular,
if such α exists, then α > 12λ . Using the definition (36) of u, we calculate
u(x)− λx2 = κ
δ2
(
1− cosh
√
2δx
cosh
√
2δβ
)
− δλ− κ
δ
x2 +
µ
δ
for |x| ≤ β.
If δλ− κ < 0, then this identity implies trivially that
u(x)>λx2 for all |x| ≤ β.(73)
Similarly, if δλ− κ= 0 and µ > 0, then (73) is true. On the other hand, if
δλ− κ > 0, then (73) is true if and only if β <
√
µ
δλ−κ because the function
x 7→ u(x)− λx2 is strictly decreasing in [0, β]. Therefore, if δλ− κ≥ 0, then
(73) is true if and only if the very last inequality in (40) holds true, thanks to
(69). It follows that the equation u(x) = λx2 has a unique solution α > β∨ 12λ
if and only if (40) is true.
Finally, it is straightforward to check that, if (40) is true, then u is
associated with the regions B = SW = ∅, C+ = [β,∞[, S+C = [α,∞[ and
W+ = [0, β[, and satisfies all of the conditions required by Definition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The calculation
d
dα
α
δ(δλ− κ)α2 − (κ+ δµ) =−
δ(δλ− κ)α2 + κ+ δµ
[δ(δλ− κ)α2 − (κ+ δµ)]2 < 0
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implies that the right-hand side of (43) defines a strictly decreasing function
on R+ \ {
√
κ+δµ
δ(δλ−κ)}. Combining this observation with the fact that tanh is
a strictly increasing function, we can see that (43) has a unique solution
α > 0 and that this solution is strictly greater than
√
κ+δµ
δ(δλ−κ) . In particular,
we can see that
tanh
√
2δx−
√
2δ(δλ− κ)x
δ(δλ− κ)x2 − (κ+ δµ)
(74) 

> 0, if x ∈
]
0,
√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ)
[
∪ ]α,∞[,
< 0, if x ∈
]√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ) , α
[
,
which implies that the solution α of (43) is less than or equal to 12λ if and
only if the inequalities in (45) are true.
In what follows, we assume that the problem data satisfy (45), in which
case, u is associated with the regions B =∅, S+W = [α, 12λ ], C+ = S+C = [ 12λ ,∞[
and W+ = [0, α[. We will show that u satisfies all of the conditions in Defi-
nition 1 if and only if we prove that
u′(x)≤ 1 for all x ∈ [0, α],(75)
u(x)− λx2 ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [0, α],(76)
Lu(x) + h(x)≡ 1
2
u′′(x)− δu(x) + κx2 + µ
(77)
≤ 0 for all x ∈
]
α,
1
2λ
[
.
Inequality (75) follows immediately from the convexity of u and the fact
that u′(α) = 2λα≤ 1. Inequality (76) is equivalent to
δ(δλ− κ)α2 − (κ+ δµ)
cosh
√
2δα
≥ f2(x) for all x ∈ [0, α],(78)
where
f2(x) =
δ(δλ− κ)x2 − (κ+ δµ)
cosh
√
2δx
.
Since α>
√
κ+δµ
δ(δλ−κ) , (78) is plainly true for all x≤
√
κ+δµ
δ(δλ−κ) . On the other
hand, we can use (75) to calculate
f ′2(x) =
√
2δ[δ(δλ− κ)x2 − (κ+ δµ)]
cosh
√
2δx
[ √
2δ(δλ− κ)x
δ(δλ− κ)x2 − (κ+ δµ) − cosh
√
2δx
]
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> 0 for all x ∈
]√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ) , α
[
,
and (76) follows.
Inequality (77) is equivalent to
λ− (δλ− κ)x2 + µ≤ 0 for all x∈
]
α,
1
2λ
[
⇔ α≥
√
λ+ µ
δλ− κ.
In view of (75), this is true if and only if
tanh
√
2δ(λ+ µ)
δλ− κ <
√
2δ(λ+ µ)
δλ− κ
because
√
2δ(λ+µ)
δλ−κ >
√
κ+δµ
δ(δλ−κ) ⇔ δλ− κ > 0. This inequality is indeed true
because
√
2δ(λ+µ)
δλ−κ > 1⇔ δλ+ κ+2δµ > 0, and (77) follows. 
Proof of Proposition 4. If we denote by f3(α) the right-hand side
of (49), then we can check that
f ′3(α) =−
√
2δκ[δ(δλ− κ)α2 − (κ+ δµ)] + δ
√
2δ(δλ− κ)(δ − 2κα)α
[δ(δλ− κ)α2 − (κ+ δµ)]2(79)
and
f ′′3 (α) =
δ
√
2δ(δλ− κ)(6κα− δ)
[δ(δλ− κ)α2 − (κ+ δµ)]2 +
4δ2
√
2δ(δλ− κ)2(δ − 2κα)α
[δ(δλ− κ)α2 − (κ+ δµ)]3 .
If δ2κ <
√
κ+δµ
δ(δλ−κ) , then these calculations imply that
f ′3(α)> 0 and f
′′
3 (α)> 0 for all α ∈
]
δ
2κ
,
√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ)
[
.
Combining these inequalities with the observations that
f3(α) < 0 for all α ∈
[
0,
δ
2κ
[
∪
]√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ) ,∞
[
,
f3
(
δ
2κ
)
= 0 and lim
α↑
√
(κ+δµ)/(δ(δλ−κ))
f3(α) =∞
and the fact that the restriction of tanh in R+ is strictly concave, we can
see that equation (49) has a unique solution α > 0, which satisfies (50). In
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particular, we can see that
tanh
√
2δα− δ(δ − 2κα)√
2δ[δ(δλ− κ)α2 − (κ+ δµ)]
(80) 

> 0, if x ∈ ]0, α[∪
]√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ) ,∞
[
,
< 0, if x ∈
]
α,
√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ)
[
.
If
√
κ+δµ
δ(δλ−κ) <
δ
2κ , then (79) implies that
f ′3(α)< 0 for all α ∈
]√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ) ,
δ
2κ
[
.
This inequality and the calculations
f3(α)< 0 for all x ∈
[
0,
√
κ+ δµ
δ(δλ− κ)
[
∪
]
δ
2κ
,∞
[
,
lim
α↓
√
(κ+δµ)/(δ(δλ−κ))
f3(α) =∞ and f3
(
δ
2κ
)
= 0,
imply that equation (49) has a unique solution α satisfying (51). In partic-
ular, we can see that
1
2λ
< α ⇔ (53) is true.
We will show that the function u satisfies all of the requirements of Defi-
nition 1 if and only if we prove that
|u′(x)| ≤ 1 for all |x| ≤ α.(81)
If the parameters are such that (51) is true, then this inequality follows
immediately from the boundary conditions u′(0) = 0, u′−(α) = 1 and the fact
that u is convex, which is true because A> 0. If the parameters are such that
(50) is true, then A< 0. In this case, u′′′(x) = (2δ)3/2A sinh
√
2δx < 0 for all
x ∈ [0, α[, which implies that u′′ is strictly decreasing in [0, α[. Combining
this observation with the fact that u is an even function, we can see that
(81) is true if and only if limx↑α u′′(x)≥ 0, which is equivalent to α≥
√
µ
δλ−κ .
In view of (81) and the fact that
√
µ
δλ−κ <
√
κ+δµ
δ(δλ−κ) , we can see that this
indeed the case if and only if (52) is true. 
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APPENDIX II: PROOFS OF RESULTS IN SECTION 6
Proof of Proposition 6. In view of (58), we will prove that u satisfies
the conditions of Definition 1 if we show that
u′(x)≥−1 for all x≥ 0,(82)
u(x)≥−λx2 + λ for all x≥ α(83)
and
Lu(x) + h(x)≡ 12u′′(x)− δu(x)
(84)
≤ 0 for all x∈ [0, α].
Inequality (83) follows immediately by the facts that u is C1 at α and the
restriction of x 7→ u(x) + λx2 − λ in [α,∞[ is strictly convex. Inequality
(85) is equivalent to x2 ≤ 1 + δ−1 for all x ∈ [0, α], which is true because
α < 1. Finally, inequality (82) is true if and only if u′(α) ≥ −1 because
the restriction of u′ in [0,∞[ has a global minimum at α. Combining this
observation with the identity u′(α) =−2λα and (59), we can see that (82)
is satisfied if and only if (60) true. 
Proof of Proposition 7. It is a matter of straightforward algebra to
verify that α > 12λ if and only if the first inequality in (65) is true, which we
assume in what follows. Similarly, it is a matter of algebraic manipulations
to show that the constant on the left-hand side of (65) is strictly less than
the constant on the right-hand side of (65). Combining the inequality α> 12λ
with the strict concavity of the function x 7→ λx2, we can see that there exists
β ∈ [0, α[ such that the function u defined by (62) is continuous and u(x)<
λx2 for all x ∈ ]β,α[ if and only if λ≤−λα2 +α+ λ, which is equivalent to
the second inequality in (65).
We now assume that the problem data is such that (65) is true. In view of
the arguments above and (62), we will prove that u satisfies the requirements
of Definition 1 if we show that
u′(x)≥−1 for all x ∈ [0, β[∪ ]α,∞[,(85)
u(x)≥−λx2 + λ for all x≥ α,(86)
and
Lu(x) + h(x)≡ 12u′′(x)− δu(x)
(87)
≤ 0 for all x ∈ [0, β].
The inequalities (85) and (86) follow immediately by the facts that u is C1
at α, the restriction of x 7→ u(x) + λx2 − λ in [α,∞[ is strictly convex and
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0< β < 12λ < α< 1. Finally, the inequality (88) is equivalent to x
2 ≤ 1+ δ−1
for all x∈ [0, β], which is plainly true because β < 1. 
Proof of Proposition 8. The inequality u(x)<λx2 for all x ∈ [0, α[
that characterizes the region Sc = [−α,α] is true if and only if λ >−λα2 +
α+λ, which is equivalent to (68). Otherwise, the proof of this result is very
similar to the proof of Proposition 7. 
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